Abstract--This paper investigates a new spectrum sharing algorithm based on price in cognitive radio networks. A supply and demand model between primary users and secondary users is established to decide the price of free spectrum leased by primary users. Considering the utility of primary users and the total bandwidth while deciding the price per bandwidth using supply and demand balance (the spectrum supplied by primary users is the same as which demanded by secondary users) and each secondary user competes with each other according to the price to share the available bandwidth allocated by primary users. At the same time, the battery capacity of secondary users and the reliance degree that how primary users trust secondary users in the spectrum sharing process are also considered ,a new secondary utility and spectrum sharing algorithm are designed based on above factors. The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium are proved from both theoretic and simulated aspects. The simulation results show that primary users could receive maximum revenues by allocating spectrum in equilibrium price, and the spectrum shared by secondary users is directly affected by the reliance degree and remaining battery capacity of secondary users.
wireless services and the lack of spectrum caused by traditional static resource allocations. As a key technology to Cognitive Radio, the spectrum allocation methods can reuse the licensed spectrum reasonably to meet the demands of some cognitive secondary users while taking some revenues to primary users on the basis of Quality of Primary Services (Qos).
Cognitive Radio changes systems parameters in real time to be adapted to wirelss communications by sensing the available spectrum [4] . Strategy selections are included in the spectrum allocations. Game theory, which is a helpful way to solve the strategy selections, can be used as an useful method to analyze how to allocation available spectrum effectively [5] .
Nash equilibrium, which is a set of the best strategies of all the participants in the game, is an important notion in game theory. Game theory is proved to be the best effective method of spectrum allocation in distributed cognitive radio environments [6] . [7] analyzes a balance problem between supply and demand about commodity exchange in microeconomics, and the market model is given. A cognitive spectrum sharing problem including a primary user and multiple secondary users is discussed in [8] . However the utility and the available band of primary users are not considered and the price scheme is made randomly. [9] studies the impact taken by battery capacity to the wireless access in multiple-mode electric terminal.
This paper improves the shortage of [8] by considering the primary user utilities and total spectrum bandwidths. The balance between supply and demand theory (the available shared spectrum is the same as the demands of secondary uses) in [7] is used to decide the price per bandwidth. New primary and secondary utilities and spectrum allocation methods are also established as follows. Firstly, we make the spectrum price according to the primary and secondary utility functions and balance theory, which makes sure that the primary users can obtain the best profits. Then secondary users compete with each other to get access to available spectrum until all the secondary utilities reach the maximum. At last, we analyze the allocation results at the game equilibrium point.
This paper is arranged as follows: establishing the spectrum sharing model in section 2; spectrum allocation method is given and the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium are discussed in section 3; in section 4, the simulation results are given and analyzed; we make a summary of this paper in section 5.
II. SPECTRUM SHARED MODEL

A. System model
Similar to the spectrum sharing model [10] , we consider a cognitive radio environment including a primary services system (the number of services is denoted by M ) and multiple secondary services systems (the number of services is denoted by N , and user ( 1,...,
Both the primary and secondary sides share the licensed spectrum of primary ones(primary users occupy some parts to meet their own services demands with the rest being allocated to needed secondary ones). The system model is show in Fig.1 . As shown in Fig.1 , primary users possess some licensed spectrum(total bandwidths is ( ) F Hz ). The grey parts are occupied by primary users to accomplish their own services, and the rest white ones are available which can be allocated temporarily to required secondary ones.
B. Spectrum shared model
In the market economy, the participants are commodity producers and consumers. Both sides reach an agreements on the price and quantity, and the supply and demand model [7] describes this balanced relationships of price and quantity, which is also a balance between supply and demand. In this model, the supply function of producers shows commodity quantities they sell while the demand one of consumers reflects their purchasing commodity quantities, with the commodity price being an important factor to combine the participants together.
As produces, they wish a higher price while it is the opposite wish for consumers. Both sides should negotiate to make a reasonable price.
Assuming the producer utility function is denoted by 1( , ) f c n , the consumer one is 2( , ) f c n , and the price and quantity are c n 、 separately . Defining the supply function is Comparing the market model in [7] and spectrum shared model given in Fig.1 , we may establish the following corresponding relations:
Commodity--Spectrum; Producers--Primary users; Consumers--Secondary users; Commodity price--Spectrum price; Commodity quantity--Spectrum bandwidth.
A new supply and demand spectrum model is established according to the above relations. In this model, primary users supply available spectrum to demanded secondary users and both of them come to an agreement on the spectrum price and bandwidth to realize spectrum sharing.
C. Game model
The game discussed in this paper is implemented among N secondary users which compete the available spectrum with each other to maximize their personal revenue. This game can be described as [11] :
N is a finite set of all the participated secondary users; , 
III. A NEW SPECTRUM ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
The spectrum management centre allocates a licensed band to primary users. The primary ones occupy some bandwidth to meet their own services demands while obtain several profits by leasing out the rest to required secondary users. This paper gives the primary and secondary utility functions based on the model in Fig.1 and relevant parameters in cognitive radio spectrum allocations. The Nash equilibrium of spectrum price is obtained by the supply and demand theory and this price is used in the spectrum game process.
A. Primary utility
Primary utility is defined as [12] (the required bandwidth is identical for each service):
c is the spectrum price per bandwidth（1Hz）; B is spectrum bandwidth allocated to secondary users; We can find out from formulation (2) that the primary utility is made up of three parts:The first part cB is the revenue obtained by leasing out the available spectrum resource, the second one Qos caused by leasing out the spectrum.
B. Secondary utility
By considering the total bandwidth、 the reliance factor in spectrum accession for each secondary user and the remaining battery capacity of secondary terminal besides [8] , a new secondary utility is established : α is increasing with the decreasing battery capacity which results in its spectrum demand reduction adaptively; the last part is the cost by purchasing spectrum from primary users.
C. Nash equilibrium price
C.1 Primary supply function
According to balance theory, the supply function is defined when the primary utility p u reaches maximum.
We can obtain the following based on formulation (2):
The supply function is
C.2 Secondary demand function
Assuming all the secondary users as a whole, and each user has the identical bandwidths per service. The total number of secondary services is denoted by 
and the Nash equilibrium price c * is obtained as follows: 
D. The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Each player selects its own optimal strategy with given strategies of other players and all the strategies make up of a strategy set which is Nash equilibrium [14] , and in this way, there exists no player which will change its strategy to maximize its own profit. Game aims to search for this optimal strategy set. Nash equilibrium is defined as: Definition 1: Assuming (14) this set is the only Nash equilibrium of this game.
In this paper, multiple secondary users compete with each other to share the primary available spectrum and the game is not stable until no secondary revenue will be increased any longer with the equilibrium solution .Next the existence and uniqueness will be proved. Proof: According to the secondary utility given in formulation (3), we will obtain 2 (
(1 ) ) (1 )( ) Therefore, there exists the unique Nash equilibrium in this paper.
E. Dynamic game
In the practical cognitive radio environment, 
(21) Next the stability of the dynamic game is discussed in this paper on the basis of Jacobian matrix shown in the following [15] : 
we can have 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio environment including a primary service system and two secondary users ( Fig.3 gives the relations between spectrum supply and demand. There shows increasing supply and decreasing demand with increasing spectrum price. The intersect point corresponds to the equilibrium price which ensures the leased bandwidths are in the same size as the one demanded by secondary users. In cognitive spectrum sharing problems, secondary users will have a prior opportunity to get access to primary available spectrum if they establish good relationships with primary users. This good relation requires that the secondary users can exit the spectrum immediately without interfering primary ones when they need to occupy the spectrum to meet their service demands. We use a reliance factor to describe this relation. Fig.6 shows that secondary users which have higher reliance factors will be allocated more available spectrum.
In Fig.7 , the remaining battery capacities are 50% and 30% for each secondary user separately. The shared bandwidth size is increasing with the increasing total primary bandwidth, and the secondary utilities are increasing accordingly.
V. SUMMARY
A cognitive radio spectrum allocation problem including a primary service system and multiple secondary users is discussed using game theory in this paper. The primary utility is considered. Firstly, the Nash equilibrium of spectrum price is established according to supply and demand theory and primary users have the maximal utility under this equilibrium price; then a reliance factor which shows how the primary users trust secondary ones is introduced, and the spectrum allocation under different secondary received signal to noise and terminal battery capacities is analyzed; next the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium is proved; finally we find out that the allocated bandwidth size is increasing with the increased reliance factor、signal to noise and remaining battery capacity by analyzing the simulation results. Remaining battery capacity percentage of secondary user 2 spectrum of secondary users(Hz) secondary user1 secondary user2 Fig.5 The shared spectrum under different secondary battery capacity
